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Abstract
From choosing the daily lunch menu to buying or selling
stock options, decisions have to be made every day. In
general, due to incomplete information, making a decision
carries a risk. Typically, such risks are mitigated through
risk management.
However, risk is not the only element involved in the
decision process. When the decision to be made concerns
an interaction between two entities, trust plays an impor-
tant role. Trust, in such an interaction, is a prediction
of one entity’s reliance on the other entity to perform a
certain action.
In this paper we formulate a trust reference model and
take a first step towards a decision model by combining
the trust model with an existing risk model. The deci-
sion model is illustrated by an example in the e-banking
domain.
Keywords: Decision, Security Risk Management, Trust
1 Introduction
Heads or tails, chicken or beef, to buy or to sell – we
have no choice but to make decisions all the time. Every
decision carries a risk and we prefer, therefore, to base
decisions on as complete and sound information as possi-
ble. Since frequently only partial information is available,
one important part of the decision making process is risk
management. Another, in everyday decisions equally im-
portant, part of decision making is trust. Trust is used
Copyright c©2009, Australian Computer Society, Inc. This pa-
per appeared at the Australasian Information Security Con-
ference (AISC2009), Wellington, New Zealand. Conferences
in Research and Practice in Information Technology (CRPIT),
Vol. 98. Ljiljana Brankovic and Willy Susilo, Eds. Reproduc-
tion for academic, not-for profit purposes permitted provided
this text is included.
as a prediction of reliance on an action, based on what
one party, the trustor, knows about another party, the
trustee. Relevant information in such a context could be
the trustor’s experience and reputation, a third-party’s
recommendation, and so forth.
In this paper, we initiate an investigation into decision
making based on trust and risk management with a focus
on security. In particular, we are using, say, the level of
trust a client has in a service provider to the quality of
the security risk management performed by the provider
in order to facilitate a client’s decision whether or not to
engage in a transaction with the provider.
Trust and risk management are currently two very
broad and active research topics. Nevertheless, a number
of research questions are still to be addressed concerning
the implications of trust and risk in the decision process.
The specific research question addressed in this paper is
what are the concepts involved in a decision model based
on trust and risk? A modeling-based approach is used to
identify the different concepts and explain their relation-
ships. The benefits of the model are a clear ontology of
concepts existing in the trust and risk domains and a for-
malization of these concepts which enables the next step
toward automated support of the decision making process.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the risk management domain related to IS security
and summarizes the risk management model. In Section 3,
after an introduction to the notion of trust, the trust do-
main model is defined. The relation between the two mod-
els is discussed in Section 4, based on which a preliminary
model is developed. An example is presented in Section 5
in order to illustrate the model through an instantiation.
The paper ends with conclusions and an indication of open
research questions in Section 6.
Figure 1: The ISSRM domain model
2 The Information System Security Risk Man-
agement Model
In this section the Information System Security Risk Man-
agement (ISSRM) domain and its reference model are
summarized. This model has been established in previous
research (Mayer et al., 2007) and has been applied to as-
sess the support of some existing modeling languages with
regards to the ISSRM domain (Matulevicˇius, Mayer and
Heymans, 2008; Matulevicˇius, Mayer, Mouratidis, Dubois,
Heymans and Genon, 2008).
ISSRM aims at protecting assets of an organization,
from all harm to IS security which could arise accidentally
or deliberately, by using a Risk Management approach.
Assets need to be secured because they are exposed to
security risks when they are supported by an IS. In IS
security, assets are to be protected in terms of the stan-
dard security criteria, i.e. confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of information. Further properties such as au-
thenticity, accountability, non-repudiation, and reliability
may also be considered, depending on the context and
objectives of the organization.
The ISSRM domain model shown in Fig. 1 has been
obtained by identifying the core concepts in existing IS-
SRM literature and carefully analyzing the relationships
between these concepts. The complete research method-
ology applied to arrive at this model has been described
in (Mayer et al., 2007).
The core definitions of ISSRM concepts, are organized
in three categories, asset-related concepts, risk-related
concepts, and risk-treatment related concepts which are
also color-coded in Fig. 1.
Asset-related concepts describe which assets are im-
portant to protect, and which criteria guarantee asset se-
curity. An asset is anything that has value to the or-
ganization and that is central in the achievement of its
objectives (ISO, International Organisation for Standard-
isation, 2005). A business asset describes information,
processes, capabilities, and skills inherent to the business
of the organization. An IS asset is a component of the IS
supporting business assets. Security criterion character-
izes a property or constraint on business assets describing
their security needs.
Risk-related concepts present how the risk itself is
defined. A risk is the combination of a threat with one or
more vulnerabilities leading to a negative impact harming
one or more of the assets. An impact describes the poten-
tial negative consequence of a risk that may harm assets of
a system or an organization, when a threat (or the cause
of a risk) is accomplished. The event, in the frame of IS
security, is the combination of a threat and one or more
vulnerabilities. A vulnerability describes a characteristic
of an IS asset or group of IS assets and that can consti-
tute a weakness or a flaw in terms of IS security. A threat
characterizes a potential attack or incident, which targets
one or more IS assets that may lead to harm the assets. A
threat agent is an agent that can potentially cause harm
to IS assets. An attack method is a standard means by
which a threat agent carries out a threat.
Risk treatment-related concepts describe what de-
cisions, requirements and controls should be defined and
implemented in order to mitigate possible risks. A risk
treatment is a decision of the intention to treat identified
risks. A security requirement is the refinement of a risk
treatment decision to mitigate the risk. Controls (coun-
termeasures or safeguards) are means designed to improve
security, specified by a security requirement, and imple-
mented to comply with it.
3 The Trust Model
In the present section, we define the notion of trust we
consider. We develop our trust model based on a similar
methodology as the one used to arrive at the risk model
presented in the previous section.
3.1 Definition of Trust
Trust lies at the intersection of several domains, including
sociology, psychology, law, economics, ethics, and com-
puter science. For instance, in (Riegelsberger et al., 2005;
Grabner-Kra¨uter and Kaluscha, 2003; Corritore et al.,
2003) the interplay of human and social sciences with com-
puter science has lead to a new model of on-line trust.
Trust has been defined in several different ways. The
definition of trust adopted here, first formulated by Gam-
betta (Gambetta, 1988), is often referred to as “reliability
trust”. Thus, we define trust as the belief or subjective
probability of the trustor that the trustee will adequately
perform a certain action on which the trustor’s welfare de-
pends. We also refer to the trustor and trustee as agents,
which may be humans or computer programs acting on
the behalf of humans. Trust is hence a quantifiable rela-
tion between two agents.
3.2 The Consolidated Trust Model
In this section we discuss the concepts related to trust.
Starting point of our discussion is a selection of papers
representing the main views on the topic. Table 1 shows
the various concepts used in the trust literature.
Previous work has shown that trust is affected by sev-
eral subjective characteristics, such as social status, phys-
ical properties, and state of mind (Hassell, 2005; Hofstede
et al., 2006; Marsh, 1994; Ziegler and Lausen, 2004; Vasa-
lou and Pitt, 2005; Zak et al., 2004; Zak, Kurzban and
Matzner, 2005; Zak, Borja, Kurzban and Matzner, 2005).
These characteristics are commonly referred to as the per-
sonality of a human being. The characterization of the
decision maker’s personality naturally takes advantage of
psycho-sociological contributions.
Another notion related to trust is competence. It refers
to an objective measure of the abilities of the trustee to
perform a given task. The competence value is increased
for instance by the trustee’s diplomas, certificates, years
of experience, and so on.
Yet another factor influencing trust is formed by the
opinion of other entities. To every interaction between
two agents, the trustor can assign an opinion. The opinion
can be any type of valuation, for instance a real value be-
tween 0 and 1, or a simple rating such as good or bad. The
reputation of a trustee is a function of third parties’ opin-
ions from previous interactions with the trustee. A large
number of papers on trust management systems includes
reputation as a main concept (Resnick et al., 2000; Kam-
var et al., 2003; Kinateder and Rothermel, 2003; Jøsang
et al., 2003; Liu and Issarny, 2004; Nielsen and Krukow,
2004; Krukow et al., 2005; Shmatikov and Talcott, 2005;
Traupman and Wilensky, 2006; Jøsang et al., 2007). If
reputation systems allow a trustor to use third parties’
opinions about a trustee, the trustor can also ask for third
parties’ recommendations (Jøsang et al., 2006; Gray et al.,
2003; Seigneur et al., 2005). A recommendation from a
trustor to a trustee is typically obtained when there is a
chain of trusted entities from the trustor to the trustee.
Trust decisions are also defined to be dependent on the
context. The context is information such as time, location,
local norms and customs. For instance, healthcare advice
in a hospital may be trusted differently than healthcare
advice in the supermarket. Context denotes a set of ele-
ments that are independent of the trustor and the trustee.
To compute its trust, the trustor uses a policy, which is
a function over reputation, recommendation, competence,
and context as described above. The policy is the way the
trustor weighs the various information in order to make a
decision about a transaction and reflects the subjectivity
in trust. For instance, if a trustor A weighs the recommen-
dation more than the reputation, and a trustor’s friend C
tells that the trustee B is very bad, A can decide not to
cooperate with B despite B’s very good reputation.
Our consolidated trust model unifies the concepts we
have studied above and the models based on them into
one single model. The graphical representation of this
model is displayed in Fig. 2.
4 The Decision Model
In this section we present a decision model which is based
on an agent’s trust in an action of a trustee as well as the
risk in the trustee’s IS in the sense defined in Section 2
and as assessed by an external party.
To arrive at our decision model, we investigate how
risk and trust relate to each other in the decision process
and identify the overlap between them.
4.1 The Decision Process
Given a problem, a decision process aims to resolve the
problem by choosing one of several available options. This
process can be decomposed into three phases, which are
the information gathering phase, the information analysis
phase, and the decision making phase.
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(Hassell, 2005) × × × ×
(Hofstede et al., 2006) × × × ×
(Carbone et al., 2003) × × × × ×
(Agudo et al., 2005) × × ×
(Jøsang et al., 2006) × × × × ×
(Jøsang et al., 2005) × × × × × ×
(Ruohomaa and Kutvonen, 2005) × × × × ×
(Essin, 1997) × × × × × × × ×
(Viljanen, 2005) × × × × × × × × ×
Table 1: Various concepts in trust literature.
In the literature there are three approaches to making
decisions. In the field of operations research, decision is
an optimization problem which does not involve the de-
cision maker nor the context of the decision. For H.A.
Simon (Simon, 1947 (4th ed. 1997), the decision includes
analysis of the decision maker’s rationality but not the
context. A third school of thought, which is adopted here
and shared for instance by G.A. Klein (Klein and Zsam-
bok, 1996), takes both the decision maker and the context
into account.
Although the notions of risk and trust are recognized
as essential in the decision process, the relation between
the two has not yet been formally stated. In the following
section, we present this relation.
The resulting decision model has several advantages.
Compared with existing decision models, the present one
adds more granularity and sharpness to the notions of
trust and risk, as well as to their relation in the deci-
sion process. Moreover, this model has the methodologi-
cal advantage of providing a separation of concepts for the
various elements considered in the decision process. This
enables the entire model to benefit from improvements to
any of its elements. Finally, the model is independent of
decision metrics and algorithms. Thus, various metrics
and algorithms can be used to evaluate decisions auto-
matically. Furthermore, different metrics and algorithms
could be compared to each other by plugging them into
the model. This last aspect, however, will only be consid-
ered in future work.
4.2 Building the Decision Model
Several studies have shown a link between trust and risk
in the decision process. Some authors believe that risk is
an element of trust (Viljanen, 2005; Jøsang and Lo Presti,
2004; Brændeland and Stølen, 2004; Dimmock et al., 2005;
Cvrcek and Moody, 2005), while it is our position (as fol-
lows from our definitions of trust and risk), shared by
(English et al., 2004), that trust and risk are intimately
related, but that neither comprises the other. Trust
and risk are two important, partially overlapping compo-
nents which are taken into account when an agent decides
whether or not to engage in a transaction. Therefore, the
question is how to join the trust and risk models, while
taking the overlaps into consideration.
We take all components of both models into considera-
tion and study the links and overlaps in these components
in order to produce the decision model.
The central point of this decision model is the trustor,
since he is the decision maker. The decision itself is not an
object but an attribute of the trustor, since it is computed
by him.
In order to make a decision, the trustor will assess the
IS risks and evaluate the trust he has in the service pro-
vided by the trustee. The trustor will have to combine
these two elements through a decision algorithm in order
to know whether he decides to use the service. The deci-
sion algorithm depends on what metrics for risk and trust
are used. As standard trust metrics are not defined to
date and their development is left for future work, deci-
sion algorithms are consequently out of the scope of the
current paper.
Another important link between the risk model and
the trust model are the assets. The trustor’s assets are at
risk in the IS and entrusted to the trustee.
At a meta-model level, we haven’t identified further
overlaps of the trust and risk model in the decision model,
but other views of the model can emerge when consider-
ing different objectives at a model level for example. Our
decision model cannot represent such views without loos-
ing generality. The consequence of taking another point
of view could be the fusion of several components in the
decision model. For instance, if we consider a setting
where the trustee is malicious, then we can fuse the trustee
and the threat agent, hence modifying the way risk is as-
sessed. In another view, we could consider that some of
the trustee’s certificates can be seen as both an acknowl-
edgment of risk treatment and a competence.
Figure 2: The Consolidated Trust Model
The resulting Decision Model is displayed in Fig. 3.
5 An Illustrative Example
In this section we illustrate some of the details of the de-
cision model through a simple example from the field of
e-banking. We show how the various elements in the deci-
sion model get instantiated when trying to assess a client’s
decision to use a particular bank’s e-service.
Our decision model applied to any e-service environ-
ment leads to a decision process involving a client as the
decision maker and a service provider as the trustee. The
decision process takes into account the client’s trust in the
service provider (to operate on the client’s assets) as well
as the risks existing in the provider’s IS as assessed by an
external party.
We consider the fictitious company Superbank.com
as the service provider and the equally fictitious client
Mr. J. Hancock as the client. Superbank.com has been
in business for 5 years and has been issued an ISO/IEC
27001 certificate which boosts the banks competence score.
A well-known rating company gives Superbank.com 8 out
of 10 stars and Mrs. Hancock has been a satisfied customer
for over a year. It can be expected that Mr. Hancock has
some basic trust in e-banking services, since he’s young
and holds a Master’s degree. The age, sex, and academic
degree are examples of Mr. Hancock’s personality. He un-
derstands some of the risks involved in using an e-banking
service and understands enough about the auditing pro-
cess to value the ISO/IEC 27001 certificate. Mr. Han-
cock cares about his wife’s opinion, hence giving signifi-
cant weight to her recommendation, but also to the bank’s
impeccable reputation for not selling customer’s data to
telemarketers. These factors all enter into Mr. Hancock’s
policy for evaluating his trust in Superbank.com. The as-
sets Mr. Hancock is entrusting to the bank are his phone
number, address, further personal details, and a certain
amount of money.
The bank’s security objectives with respect to their
IS are to keep their customer’s personal information con-
fidential and to maintain the integrity of this informa-
tion. An external, independent company has evaluated
the bank’s risks for these security criteria. The exter-
nal company focused on assessing typical hacker attacks
and evaluated the risks for phishing, SQL injections, and
man-in-the-middle exploits. The external company used
known probability distributions for these threats and took
into account the known vulnerabilities the bank’s system
has. This allowed the company to compute the likelihood
of an undesired event and the impact such an event has on
the bank’s assets which are comprised of their IS and their
clients’ personal information. The assessment considered
the mitigating factors provided by the risk treatment the
bank employs. Table 2 summarizes the data in this exam-
ple.
Note that the purpose of the example is not to make
a decision, but rather to explain the model. In order to
make a decision based on the presented data, metrics will
Figure 3: The decision model
need to be introduced into the model. This will be ad-
dressed in future work.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have made a first step towards a decision model which
takes into account trust and IS security risks. We have
arrived at this model by using an existing risk model and
designing a new trust model. The trust model has been
arrived at through the same research methodology that
was applied in the creation of the risk model and presented
in (Mayer et al., 2007). We have illustrated the model on
a fictitious example from the e-banking domain.
Future work will naturally focus on the decision
model’s refinement, the introduction of metrics into the
model, and the development of a modeling language. Fur-
thermore, there are elements besides trust and risk which
enter into a decision process. Two particular examples
which will be addressed in future work are conviviality
and perceived usefulness, but several further elements are
conceivable.
Finally, other decision models based on trust and risk
should be investigated. A particularly interesting model
to consider would be one where the risk to be assessed is
the trustor’s risk resulting from the consequences of his
decision, as opposed to the risk existing on the trustee’s
side which was considered in this paper.
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